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This paper analyzes the impact of taxes and lending conditions on the financial structure of 
multinationals' foreign affiliates. The empirical analysis employs a large panel of affiliates of 
German multinationals in 26 countries in the period from 1996 until 2003. In accordance with 
the theoretical predictions, the effect of local taxes on leverage is positive for both types of 
debt. Moreover, while adverse local credit market conditions are found to reduce external 
borrowing, internal debt is increasing, supporting the view that the two channels of debt 
finance are substitutes. 
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July 2006 1 Introduction
Multinational corporations use not only external capital but also intercompany loans in order
to optimize their capital structure. This might contribute to a lower sensitivity of investment
decisions to di®erences in taxation across countries, and, in addition, aggravates the adverse
revenue consequences of tax planning for tax policy. While the impact of taxes on ¯nances
is well established in the literature on corporation taxes (see Auerbach, 2002, and Graham,
2003, for a survey), the multinationals' choice of the capital structure has only recently been
addressed in the empirical literature. For Canadian- and US-controlled ¯rms Jog and Tang
(2001) found a signi¯cant impact of tax rate di®erentials between Canada and the US. For a
sample of US controlled a±liates Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) show that especially internal
borrowing of US corporations is sensitive to taxation. It is, however, not obvious whether
these results can be generalized to other countries where multinationals are not subject to a
tax credit system. The current paper considers the impact of taxes on the capital structure
of German corporations for which, as is typical for EU countries, repatriated foreign pro¯ts
are basically exempt from corporation taxes.
2 Theoretical Background
Following Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), corporations would generally favor debt, since
the tax shield from deductible interest expenses increases the company value. In order to
explain why corporations nevertheless use equity, the literature uses alternative theories (see
Myers, 2001, and Auerbach, 2002). Generally, these theories stress the trade-o® between the
gains from the tax shield through interest deductions and the agency cost of debt, re°ecting
the inability to solve potential con°ict between equity and debt claimants by means of
contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers, 1977).
2To derive the optimal capital structure, consider the pro¯t function for a multinational
¼ = f (k1)(1 ¡ t1) + f (k2)(1 ¡ t2) (1)
¡ [i1¸1k1 + i2¹1k1](1 ¡ t1)
¡ [i2¸2k2 + i1¹2k2](1 ¡ t2)
¡ r[k1 (1 ¡ ¸1 ¡ ¹1) + k2 (1 ¡ ¸2 ¡ ¹2)]
¡ [c1 (¸1;¹1)k1 + c2 (¸2;¹2)k2];
where f (ki) denotes the output at location i where ki units of capital are employed. ti
is the local tax rate on capital income. The second and third lines capture the cost of
debt, where ¹i;¸i denote the share of capital ¯nanced with internal and external debt,
respectively. Internal debt is remunerated at the other location's interest rate.1 While the
fourth line contains the opportunity cost of equity, the last line captures the agency cost
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the two types of ¯nance are substitutes, since the marginal agency cost for each type of
debt would increase if the other type of debt is used more heavily. We further impose some








¯ such that cross-e®ects are
always dominated by the own e®ects.
The pro¯t function assumes that the lending part of the multinational incurs debt in order
to ¯nance the loan, implying that the required rate of return on equity is higher than the
net-of-tax cost of debt. This assumption is likely to be met if the lending part is located
in a high-tax country, such that there is little incentive to transform foreign into domestic
pro¯ts.2 We retain this assumption, since the empirical analysis is concerned with the case of
German multinationals, where the parent company is indeed located in a high tax country.
1The company might have an incentive to set the interest rates above the market value, but we assume
that the arm's length principle is e®ective.
2The alternative case is discussed by Mintz and Smart (2005).
3Given the pro¯t function the optimum share of external debt incurred by a±liate 2 obeys
r ¡ (1 ¡ t2)i2 = c2;¸ (¸2;¹2): (2)
The convexity of c2 implies that if r > (1 ¡ t2)i2, ¸2 is positive. Thus, if the after-tax
return to capital is below the required rate of return on equity, there will be some external
borrowing. The optimum share of internal funds used at location 2 is determined by
r ¡ (1 ¡ t2)i1 = c2;¹ (¸2;¹2): (3)
If the after-tax return to capital for intercompany debt is below the required rate of return
on equity r > (1 ¡ t2)i1, a part of the capital invested at location 2 is ¯nanced with internal
debt.
We can derive the comparative static properties by di®erentiating the system of the two
¯rst-order conditions which we obtained from our pro¯t function.
2
4 i2dt2 ¡ (1 ¡ t2)di2













Solving for the respective channel of ¯nance we can state the corresponding comparative
static e®ects. Let us consider ¯rst the e®ects of the interest rate on external debt
d¸2
di2
= (1=jHj)(¡(1 ¡ t2)c2;¹¹) < 0; (4)
where the determinant of the Hessian jHj is positive given the regularity assumptions about
the cost function.3 Thus, the expression is unambiguously negative, indicating that an










4With regard to internal debt we obtain
d¹2
di2
= (1=jHj)(+(1 ¡ t2)c2;¸¹) ? 0: (5)
Assuming that the two types of debt act as substitutes (c2;¸¹ > 0) the expression is positive,
indicating that an increase in the local interest rate causes an increase in inter-company
debt. Making use, once more, of the imposed regularity conditions we note that the direct
impact on external borrowing (4) always dominates and total leverage declines.
Furthermore, let us consider the e®ects of the tax rate
d¸2
dt2
= (1=jHj)(i2c2;¹¹ ¡ i1c2;¸¹) ? 0: (6)
Given the two types of debt act as substitutes (c2;¸¹ > 0), the sign is ambiguous. But if the
interest rate at the parent location is not much higher than the interest rate at the a±liate,




= (1=jHj)(i1c2;¸¸ ¡ i2c2;¸¹) ? 0: (7)
If the interest rates di®er not much, higher taxation also leads to a higher leverage related
to intercompany loans.
3 Data and Speci¯cation
The ¯rst-order conditions give rise to two basic testable relationships for the ¯nances of
foreign a±liates of German multinationals. The comparative static properties suggest that
external capital used at location j should decline in the pre-tax rate of interest but increase in
the local tax rate. With regard to intercompany loans our analysis suggests that the amount
5of intercompany loans used at a location is an increasing function of the local tax rate as
it reduces the net-of-tax rate of interest. Via its impact on external borrowing, however,
also the local interest rate will matter. Given these considerations, the same estimation
equation can be used for either type of leverage of an a±liate in country j held by a German
multinational k in period t
Yj;k;t = a0 + a1xj;k;t + a2tj;t + a3 logij;t + ak + at + ²j;t;
where at is a time-speci¯c and ak group-speci¯c e®ect for all a±liates held by company k.
Note that the former also captures the interest rate at the parent location as we consider
only German multinationals. The company-speci¯c e®ect encompasses the company-speci¯c
opportunity cost of capital r which might also include elements of personal taxation at the
level of the shareholder. xj;k;t captures further characteristics of the subsidiary which a®ect
the use of debt or the access to credit. As the lending rate is di±cult to measure we separate
out its impact from that of taxes, captured by the tax rate as an approximation to the log
of unity minus tax rate.
The empirical analysis uses a Bundesbank database providing annual ¯rm-level panel data
for the period 1996 to 2003. The collection of the data is prescribed by German law, which
determines reporting mandates for international transactions (Lipponer, 2006). Since the
model assumes a two-tier company structure, we focus on majority owned subsidiaries and
exclude indirectly held investment. Furthermore, as the underlying model deals with a case
where production takes place at each location, holdings and ¯nancial service providers as
well as observations with non-positive capital and turnover are excluded as well.
In order to capture the tax incentive, the analysis employs the statutory tax rate on corporate
income modi¯ed by applicable restrictions on interest deductions. Thus, the statutory tax
rate represents the tax savings from deducting one unit of interest. Since the e®ective tax
reduction from using debt is zero if there is a loss carry-forward (MacKie-Mason, 1990) a
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Capital (e 1,000) 31,258 175,776 112 15,200,000
Turnover (e 1,000) 52,486 370,006 1,000 51,900,000
External leverage .364 .250 0 1
Internal leverage .248 .250 0 1
Statutory tax rate .346 .068 .100 .532
Loss carry-forward .292 .455 0 1
Lending rate .075 .044 .027 .364
40,300 observations covering subsidiaries in 26 host countries in the
eight years from 1996 - 2003. Tax rate and lending rate vary only
by country-year cells.
corresponding dummy variable is included. In the lack of information about ¯rm-speci¯c
interest expenses, we employ the lending rates for credit to the private sector taken from the
IMF, augmented, where possible, with ECB data. In order to control for further variation
in the lending conditions we employ turnover as an indicator of size and cash-°ow of the
a±liate both of which will generally be positively associated with the lending conditions. As
agency cost may also vary across industries, we control for further heterogeneity by including
dummies for 71 industries at the level of the a±liate. Table 1 and 2 report descriptive
statistics.
4 Results
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 report estimation results for the ratio of external debt to the
a±liate's total stock of capital. The results con¯rm a positive impact of taxes and an adverse
e®ect of local lending conditions on the leverage. The presence of a loss carry-forward exerts
7Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Outbound FDI
Observations Capital Share of Share of Share of
(e 1,000) Debt Ext. Debt Int. Debt
Destination Country Number Percent Mean Mean Mean Mean
Australia 852 2.11 17,715 .619 .303 .316
Austria 2,601 6.45 25,318 .605 .380 .225
Belgium 1,666 4.13 43,044 .634 .381 .253
Canada 679 1.68 31,141 .541 .316 .225
Czech Republic 2,180 5.41 25,151 .623 .360 .264
Denmark 765 1.90 18,844 .656 .404 .253
Finland 304 0.75 19,589 .566 .325 .240
France 4,861 12.06 27,890 .646 .405 .241
Great Britain 3,312 8.22 29.949 .560 .350 .246
Greece 404 1.00 22,245 .651 .373 .278
Hungary 1,368 3.39 36,191 .564 .335 .229
Ireland 331 0.82 19,575 .502 .279 .224
Italy 3,305 8.20 28,951 .720 .439 .282
Japan 954 2.37 54.095 .672 .460 .211
Luxembourg 58 0.14 17,254 .702 .496 .206
Mexico 562 1.39 62,787 .512 .245 .267
Netherlands 2,133 5.29 28,528 .576 .336 .240
New Zealand 116 0.29 11,101 .536 .269 .267
Norway 327 0.81 26,060 .605 .345 .260
Poland 2,533 6.29 19,448 .610 .341 .269
Portugal 317 0.79 24,813 .562 .344 .218
Slovakia 448 1.11 28,476 .566 .328 .238
Spain 2,739 6.80 33,263 .607 .379 .227
Sweden 934 2.32 20,638 .614 .339 .274
Switzerland 2,610 6.48 18.674 .549 .367 .182
USA 3,941 9.78 57,781 .583 .300 .283
Total 40,300 100.00 31,258 .612 .364 .248
Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample covering German outbound FDI in the period from
1996 until 2003. The list of host countries includes 26 countries, 14 of these countries are EU
members in the period analyzed.
8a weak negative impact, indicating that a loss carry-forward either directly reduces the gain
from tax savings by debt ¯nance, or, alternatively, that uncertainties hamper access to credit.
The positive sign of turnover in column (2) is in accordance with the view that a larger size
or cash-°ow improves the access to external capital. Column (3) shows that the results are
robust if also industry dummies control for further heterogeneity among a±liates. Columns
(4)-(6) report results for internal debt. Again, we ¯nd a signi¯cant positive e®ect of the
statutory tax rate. After inclusion of controls for industries and turnover, the coe±cient is
only slightly smaller than in the case of external debt. The e®ect of the lending rate, however,
di®ers, showing a positive e®ect on the share of internal debt. This conforms with the view
that external and internal debt are substitutes. A substitutive relationship is further in
accordance with the results for the turnover, which exerts opposite e®ects on external and
internal debt.
While the empirical results represent average e®ects, some a±liates report zero levels of
external and/or internal capital, where speci¯c conditions may impede an interior solution.
The results, reported in Table 4, are, however, not much di®erent.
The impact of local lending conditions is in accordance with Desai et al., who employ indica-
tors of the local credit market including the rate of in°ation, measures of country risk, cred-
itor rights, and the size of the credit market. As shown in Table 5, the empirical variation in
the lending rate used in our analysis can be well predicted by their measures. Consequently,
alternative estimations using the predicted lending rate or instrumental variable approaches
obtained rather similar results.
With regard to the magnitude of the estimated e®ects, the results suggest that a 10 percent-
age point increase in the statutory tax rate on corporate earnings is associated approximately
with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the external debt ratio (column 3) and a 1.5 percent-
age point increase in the internal debt ratio (column 6), taken together the leverage increases
by 3.4 percentage points.This is partly consistent with Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), who
9Table 3: Results
Dependent variable Share of External Debt Share of Internal Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory tax rate .240 ? .177 ? .187 ? .135 ? .192 ? .153 ?
(.046) (.050) (.050) (.032) (.033) (.033)
(log)Lending rate -.042 ? -.035 ? -.037 ? .039 ? .032 ? .043 ?
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Loss carry-forward -.007 ? -.003 -.003 .059 ? .055 ? .059 ?
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .028 ? .027 ? -.025 ? -.016 ?
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Industry e®ects no no yes no no yes
R2 .029 .044 .052 .022 .032 .068
Company and time ¯xed e®ects included. Standard errors are robust against random
¯rm-speci¯c and country e®ects using the usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An
asterisk denotes signi¯cance at 5% level. 40,300 observations, 4,115 ¯rms.
10Table 4: Results for Non-Zero Observations
Dependent variable Share of External Debt Share of Internal Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory tax rate .225 ? .154 ? .165 ? .124 ? .201 ? .161 ?
(.047) (.051) (.052) (.034) (.034) (.035)
(log)Lending rate -.050 ? -.042 ? -.045 ? .050 ? .038 ? .048 ?
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Loss carry-forward -.012 ? -.007 ? -.008 ? .061 ? .056 ? .059 ?
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .031 ? .030 ? -.034 ? -.024 ?
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Industry e®ects no no yes no no yes
R2 .034 .055 .064 .026 .045 .081
Empirical results for observations with non-zero debt only. The sample size is reduced
slightly. Company level and time ¯xed e®ects included. Standard errors are robust
against random ¯rm-speci¯c and country e®ects using the usual Huber-White sandwich
formula. An asterisk denotes signi¯cance at 5% level. 35,469 observations, 3,761 ¯rms.
¯nd that German multinationals respond almost exclusively with internal debt. However,
our results do support e®ects on external debt as well.
Comparing our results with Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) we ¯nd that the elasticity of
external borrowing implied by the point estimate is rather similar. Evaluated at mean
values of taxes and leverage, the elasticity of external borrowing is 0.18 in the German case
compared with 0.19 in the US case. The elasticity of internal borrowing in the German case
is, however, only 0.21 as compared to 0.35 in the US case.
11Table 5: Determinants of the Lending Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In°ation 1.03 ? .691 ? .692 ? .667 ?
(.058) (.068) (.068) (.071)
Country risk 2.47 ? 2.25 ? 2.37 ?
(.476) (.502) (.526)
Private credit -.004 -.000
(.003) (.004)
Creditor rights -.195 ?
(.098)
R2 .770 .808 .810 .816
Determinants of the lending rate for the panel of 26 host coun-
tries from 1996 to 2003. In°ation is taken from World Eco-
nomic Outlook Database. Country risk is an index provided
by the German investment credit insurance agency which ranks
from 1 (low risk) to 7 (high risk). Private credit represents the
ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP in %
taken from World Development Indicators as provided by the
World Bank. The Creditor rights index is also taken from the
World Bank. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicat-
ing that the risk to the creditor is lower. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity. An asterisk denotes signi¯cance
at 5% level. Time dummies are included. 184 observations
covering 26 countries over 8 years.
125 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the capital structure choice of multinationals con¯rms that the
local tax burden exerts important e®ects on the a±liate's leverage. This refers not only
to external debt; our ¯ndings indicate that a higher local tax rate is also associated with
an increase in internal debt. This shows that multinationals have access to an additional
instrument which can be used to exploit the tax savings opportunities of debt ¯nance.
The failure to ¯nd a higher tax sensitivity in the German as compared to the US case
indicates that the international tax regime with regard to tax exemption vs. tax credit has
little impact on the tax sensitivity of ¯nances. This suggests that the foreign tax credit
may actually be alleviated by deferred repatriation of pro¯ts (e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994,
Altshuler and Grubert, 2003, Grubert, 2003) or other forms of tax planning.
A ¯nal remark is in order on the potential role of constraints such as thin-capitalization
rules. Given the existence of such rules, the tax sensitivity of the capital structure might
be underestimated to some extent. The analysis of the consequences of those constraints is,
however, left for future research.
Datasources and De¯nitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank (MiDi), see
Lipponer (2006) for an overview. The internal and external components of the leverage
are determined by the level of balance-sheet liabilities in the respective category divided
by total capital consisting of registered capital, capital reserves and pro¯t reserves, as
well as internal and external debt.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD, and from tax surveys provided by the
tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. The statutory tax rate vari-
13able contains statutory pro¯t tax rates modi¯ed by applicable restrictions on interest
deductions.
Lending rate refers to credits to the private sector taken from the IMF International Fi-
nancial Yearbook (2005) augmented with corresponding ECB ¯gures.
Country Risk is a risk index provided by the German investment credit insurance agency
(AuslandsgeschÄ aftsabsicherung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), which ranks from 1
(low risk) to 7 (high risk).
Creditor Rights index taken from World Bank doining business project ranges from 0
to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better
designed to expand acces to credit.
In°ation is taken from World Economic Outlook Database.
Private Credit contains domestic credit to private sector to GDP in % taken from World
Development Indicators provided by World Bank.
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